City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Theses and Dissertations

Hunter College

Winter 1-6-2022

Original Intent: Brown vs. Board of Education, White Backlash, &
the Enduring Power of De Facto Segregation
Aaron Brand
CUNY Hunter College

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/hc_sas_etds/822
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

Brand 1

Original Intent:
Brown vs. Board of Education, White Backlash, & the Enduring Power
of De Facto Segregation
By
Aaron Brand

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts in History, Hunter College,
The City University of New York
2021

12/10/2021
Date

Professor D’Weston Haywood
Thesis Sponsor

12/10/2021
Date

Professor Jonathan Rosenberg
Second Reader

Brand 2

Dedication

To my dad, Walter Brand, who would be so proud.

Brand 3

Acknowledgements
I would like to give my utmost gratitude to my professors at Hunter College, namely Professor
D’Weston Haywood, Professor Jonathan Rosenberg, and Professor Benjamin Hett, who piqued
my interest in their domains of expertise, and who motivated my own historical inquiry. I would
also like to thank my cohort of peers for their support and grounding levity throughout my time
in the graduate program, Jason Tom, Harvey A. Sniffen III, and Michael Frank. Most
importantly, none of this could be possible without the love and everlasting support of my mom
and sister, and especially my wife for pushing me to reach the finish line.

Brand 4

Table of Contents
Abstract & Keywords
Preface
Introduction
Where War and Civil Rights Meet
Plessy v. Ferguson Redefined
“Massive Resistance”
De Jure vs. De Facto Segregation
Epilogue
Bibliography

Brand 5

Abstract
This thesis examines the factors and outcomes surrounding Brown v. Board of Education of
1954. The events that predated it and the resistance that followed determined the chain of
consequences from this perceived victory over racial bias. The calculated and persistent backlash
against integration obscured Brown’s intent of educational opportunity.

Keywords
Brown v Board of Education (Brown), Massive Resistance, Plessy v. Ferguson, segregation,
desegregation, integration, de jure segregation, de facto segregation, Little Rock Crisis, Little
Rock nine, Backlash Thesis
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Preface
On May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court handed down Brown v. Board of Education, one of
the most groundbreaking decisions in American history. The Court voted unanimously to declare
segregation of children in public schools unconstitutional. In his brief, yet unwavering opinion,
Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote, “Segregation of white and Negro children in public schools
solely on the basis of race... deprives children of the minority group of equal opportunities.”1
Brown meant African American communities could integrate public schools and access ample
community, state, and federal funding and resources. Access to a good education was one crucial
pathway for the children of many African American families to work their way out of cycles of
poverty and a low social status. Simply put, better education meant more opportunity, it was
thought, forming the crux of Brown.
Brown would challenge nearly every facet of life in the country because it centered the
topic of race relations at the forefront of the public mind, and brought the Black freedom struggle
close to home for many White Americans. Indeed, these developments were inextricably linked.
The day after Brown was ruled, The Washington Post emphasized the importance of educational
opportunity and what the ruling meant, at least at first. It stated,
Segregation is a hangover from slavery, and its ugliest manifestation has been in
the schools. Rooted in a denial of human equality, it has always been, like the evil
institution that spawned it, a blight upon American life. Its effect was divisive. It
separated Americans into superior and inferior races, and by subordinating one to the
other gave the fiction a semblance of reality. Now, at last, the equality of opportunity
which is a fundamental premise of the American society is to become a fact in regard to
education -- which is, after all, the key to opportunity.2
1

Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka et al., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The opinion of the Brown case written
by Supreme Court Justice Earl Warren would, in the succeeding decades, become the focal point of specific
language that was interpreted in many different ways -- inciting critical debate in the world of education and how
states would carry out desegregation.
2
Abby Phillip, “How the Washington Post covered the Brown v. Board of Education in 1954,” The Washington
Post, May 16, 2014, accessed July 25, 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2014/05/16/how-the-washington-post-covered-bro wn-v-board-of-education-in-1954/.
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Overt discriminatory policies and actions against Black people since the end of the Civil War
promoted the false notion that African Americans were incapable of intellectual equality with
White people. More than anything, Brown would turn this on its head.
Opportunity for education was the cornerstone undergirding the Supreme Court’s ruling
in favor of the plaintiff. Justice Warren cited the importance of education as the primary pathway
for young children to succeed later in life. He explained,
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society…
[I]t is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him
for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if
he is denied the opportunity of an education.3
Breaking the color barrier in education was immediately regarded as a triumph of diversity and
racial democracy. Black people celebrated the recognition that their education was valued, and
many liberal White leaders used it to tout the greatness of American equality. Why then, in the
many decades that followed such an historical and racially significant moment, do historians
debate the lasting impact that Brown had?
This thesis will explore critical events and ideas that led up to, as well as resulted from,
the Brown decision. The aftermath of Brown, from the local to the federal level, stole attention
away from the original intention of equal opportunity -- the very meaning of Brown.
Consequently, the broader aftermath of Brown became the focal point of the ongoing legacy of
the case. The consequences that stemmed from Brown prolonged the goal of achieving
integration and equal educational opportunities. Instead of uniting the country under a shared

3

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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common interest in education and equality, the Brown decision exacerbated divisions in the
country, which ultimately resulted in profoundly negative outcomes, which over many decades,
hindered the social, racial, and educational standing of African Americans across the United
States.
Looking back, historians, legal scholars, and activists have continually reexamined the
ramifications of Brown, and in doing so, have been forced to reconsider the kind of effect it had,
not only on education, but also on racial equality in the United States. Many question the
significance of Brown, and ask whether it caused more harm than good. While it is clear that
there have been both positives and negatives that flowed from the Brown decision, certain
outcomes were more detrimental than anticipated. For a ruling that should have marked a
decisive step forward for African American rights and equality, it instead exposed the glaring
racism that would manifest into massive resistance.
Brown should not be considered a landmark moment because its overall impact on Civil
Rights and educational equality was minimal. But this was no accident. For what Brown stands
for in theory, and for a ruling that could have changed the foundational structure and goals of the
American educational system and everything that that system touches, Brown failed to achieve
much of what it was intended to do because of fierce and calculated resistance.
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Introduction
Constructed in the aftermath of Brown was a wall of white resistance that formed a
massive backlash. This resistance was advanced by politicians and everyday citizens determined
to thwart any seeming victory that Brown ensured for African Americans. Their efforts distorted
the intention meant to be the fundamental goal of Brown -- the goal of better education. Contrary
to the belief that African Americans would benefit simply by sharing the same spaces as White
people, Black people wanted to have a semblance of ownership over the education their children
would receive. More than fifty years later, Cheryl Brown Henderson, daughter of the eponymous
Oliver Brown, claimed that the original intention of the Brown ruling was opportunity. She
asserted, "Education is the most important function of government, and without it, a child cannot
expect to succeed. Brown v. Board was never just about sitting next to white children -- it was
about sharing the same resources they had access to. Education was the down payment on
freedom. Education is the down payment on opportunity."4 But fervent opposition to Brown
obscured the central point of educational opportunity.
This paper will analyze a number of legal texts and their evaluations of the backlash, as
well as the social consequences and legacy of the Brown decision. Though historians often point
to the Brown case as a springboard to the Civil Rights Movement and a catalyst for the general
expansion of educational opportunities, it has more so reflected the nation’s difficulties in
dismantling systemic racism and discrimination. What ensued in the post-Brown era was a
continued struggle for educational equality that undermined the original intent of the ruling amid

Joseph Serwach, “Brown Sisters Explore Half-Century of Desegregation,” The University Record Online,
University of Michigan, accessed August 1, 2021. https://www.ur.umich.edu/0304/Jan19_04/06.shtml.
4
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a sweeping undercurrent of resistance to racial equality in public schools and in society more
broadly.5
Chapter one addresses how World War II and the Cold War influenced civil rights
activists and how the government came to view race relations as part of the national agenda. As
America emerged from World War II, issues of race moved to the forefront. The implications of
the Cold War bore significant weight in the Brown ruling as well. The convergent dilemmas of
national security and racial equality coalesced between the two agendas. Chapter two briefly
identifies the constitutional interpretation of the fourteenth amendment as it related to the 1896
Supreme Court ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson, which declared segregation legal. In order for the
court to overturn the segregationist policy, both a major Supreme Court ruling and the
Constitution would need to be redefined. Chapter three follows the immediate and extreme
response to Brown, known as, “massive resistance.” This reaction to Brown set into motion an
oppositional movement of white resistance that fought staunchly against integration. From
deliberate delays, to local and state legislative obstructions, to targeted and extreme racial
violence, there emerged myriad ways in which mostly Southern districts combatted African
Americans’ efforts to gain entry into White schools. The Little Rock crisis in 1957 exemplified
how far to the resistance would go to deter integration. Chapter four traces the binary between de
jure and de facto segregation. De jure segregation denoted the discriminatory laws, largely found
in the South, that intentionally separated races under Plessy v. Ferguson. De facto segregation is
distinguished from de jure segregation because it emanated, for example, from “the innocuous

Sonja Ramsey, “The Troubled Legacy of American Education after the Brown Decision,” Organization of
American Historians, accessed July 22, 2021. https://www.oah.org/tah/issues/2017/february/the-troubled-history-ofamerican-education-after-the-brown-decision/.
5
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result of free-market forces” that led to the unintentional separation of races by neighborhood.6
Veiled as an accidental racial imbalance, school districts in places like the North could avoid the
stigma of outright racial bias exhibited in the South.7 Yet, de facto segregation reflected the
largely unspoken rules and customs of a Jim Crow regime that was not regional but national in
character. Despite their extra-legal nature, these rules and customs were still enforced by the
state, private entities, and institutions. The difference in these forms of segregation would
undermine the execution of Brown. De jure segregation could be reversed by positive law, but de
facto segregation helped maintain the structures of segregation while simultaneously helping
absolve segregationist politicians and communities. This perpetuated a subtler expression of
racism that persisted in school communities throughout the country, and helps preserve racial
inequality in schools to this day. The Epilogue will show that while undoubtedly positive in
nature and intention, Brown v. Board ultimately led to outcomes that backfired and reverberated
since -- not only in the world of education, but also within the ongoing Black freedom struggle,
representing a pivotal example of how the movement took one step forward with Brown, and yet,
two steps back.

Michael R. Glass, “From Sword to Shield to Myth: Facing the Facts of De Facto School Segregation,” Journal of
Urban History 44, no. 6 (2016): 1197-1226.
7
Robert L. Carter, “De Facto School Segregation: An Examination of the Legal and Constitutional Questions
Presented,” Case Western Reserve Law Review 16, no. 3 (1965): 502-31.
6
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Where War and Civil Rights Meet
During World War II, the country experienced major changes abroad and at home. The
United States became the center of the global stage, a stage upon which African Americans could
leverage their fight to advance racial equality. The fight for democracy abroad intensified their
fight for equal freedoms at home. This position was magnified during the Cold War. For the U.S.
government, Brown was the perfect high-profile event to help advertise American democracy to
the world. This backdoor incentive to promote equality for Black people can be seen more as a
way to promote U.S. foreign policy interests, rather than to help advance the cause of racial
justice in the U.S.8 As a result though, the U.S. was not as dedicated to carrying out
desegregation after Brown.
For Black people, the eruption of World War II meant that U.S. involvement in a war
against totalitarianism would aid African Americans’ fight against oppression at home. Civil
Rights leaders launched the “Double V” campaign, which stood for two victories, victory against
fascism overseas and victory against racism in the U.S.9 The National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the 1941 March on Washington Movement
declared that in order for all peoples of America to be loyal to their country they would need
their rights secured. Statements by Arthur Spingarn, legal counsel of the NAACP, reflected the
deep links between the fight for civil rights and the fight against fascism when he invoked the
language of Woodrow Wilson, declaring, “We cannot make the world safe for democracy until
we first make democracy safe in America.”10 The U.S. could no longer claim total victory until

8

Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: The Relationship Between Civil Rights and Foreign Affairs in the
Truman Administration (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 12-15.
9
Ronald T. Takaki, Double Victory: A Multicultural History of America in World War II (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 2001), 4.
10
Jonathan Rosenberg, How Far the Promised Land?: World Affairs and the American Civil Rights Movement from
the First World War to Vietnam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 134.

Brand 13

certain measures were made on the homefront to spread equality and democracy throughout the
entire country.
African American activists bolstered their argument by mobilizing around the notions
expressed by the government itself. As historian Ronald Takaki has noted, “The fervent defense
of freedom was accompanied by a hypocritical disregard for our nation’s declaration that ‘all
men are created equal.’”11 When the Black scholar and activist, W. E. B. DuBois, referred to
World War II as the “War for Racial Equality,” he also shined a spotlight on American duplicity
to the international community, which would end up tying the hands of U.S. governmental
officials.12 Black activists reasoned that if the ideals for which the U.S. fought in World War II
could indeed be transformed to shift the focus onto racial equality, then a “Double Victory”
could actually be achieved.
What made this argument even more compelling for African Americans was that they
were fighting on the premise of defending democracy. Yet, while fighting abroad, Black soldiers
were forced to fight in segregated military units. For many Black activists, questions emerged
about how African Americans could commit to making the ultimate sacrifice for a country that
treated them as second-class citizens at home and abroad, during peace and war. As Takaki
notes, Dorie Miller, a Black soldier in the U.S. Navy, remarked, “The Negro people for a long
time have wondered what kind of war for democracy it is that must be fought by a Jim Crow
navy.”13 Segregation in the army directly mirrored Jim Crow segregation in the U.S. The clear
double standard compromised the democratic values the U.S. exalted on the world stage.

11

Takaki, Double Victory, 5.
Ibid, 7.
13
Ibid, 19.
12
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The linkages that were made between WWII and race relations would be critical for
Black activists, but also for U.S. policy on the international stage. Eighteen years after the Brown
decision, Chief Justice Warren reflected on why WWII was crucial to the path for the eventual
ruling on Brown. He commented,
The reversal of race relation policies in the United States was fostered primarily by the
presence of World War II itself. First, the primary enemy of the Allies, Nazi Germany,
was perhaps the most conspicuously and brutally racist nation in the history of the
world… The segregation and extermination of non-Aryans in Hitler's Germany were
shocking for Americans, but they also served as a troublesome analogy. While
proclaiming themselves inexorably opposed to Hitler's practices, many Americans were
tolerating the segregation and humiliation of nonwhites within their own borders. The
contradiction between the egalitarian rhetoric employed against the Nazis and the
presence of racial segregation in America was a painful one.14
Even as Civil Rights leaders were utilizing World War II to bolster their own rhetoric, the
U.S. government began to believe that progress on civil rights for African Americans could
benefit the country’s new-found international role. The vacuum left in Europe at the end of
World War II ushered in a new international conflict with the Soviet Union, but the same
questions about the meaning of American freedom vis-a-vis Black people remained. In “Brown
as a Cold War Case,” Mary L. Dudziak articulates the growing interconnectedness between the
progress in race relations and the national incentives brought on by the Cold War.15 In a series of
amicus curiae briefings just before Brown, the U.S. government insisted on its participation on
such matters because segregation was harmful to foreign affairs. The U.S. argued,
[T]he existence of discrimination against minority groups has an adverse effect upon our
relations with other countries. Racial discrimination furnishes grist for the Communist
propaganda mills, and it raises doubts even among friendly nations as to the intensity of
our devotion to the democratic faith.16
“Brown v. Board of Education in International Context Centre for Human Rights. University of Pretoria, South
Africa, February 7, 2006. Ruth Bader Ginsburg Associate Justice Supreme Court of the United States,” Supreme
Court of the United States, accessed August 4, 2021.
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeech/sp_02-07a-06.
15
Mary L. Dudziak, “Brown as a Cold War Case,” Journal of American History 91, no. 1 (2004): 32–42.
16
Ibid, 34.
14
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If Cold War objectives were being compromised due to racial problems, then it is conceivable to
believe that the U.S. would intervene for the benefit of its own international agenda. Dudziak
credits legal scholar Derrick A. Bell Jr. with the notion that civil rights reform was not advanced
to achieve rights for all; rather, it was advanced based on the “self-interest and limited
commitment” of the government -- a reality that would be exploited by opponents of Brown.17
While the U.S. government was promoting its brand of democracy to the world,
increasing concerns emerged among power-brokers that the race problem at home would impact
the way the country was perceived overseas. Once again, this gave Black activists the platform to
leverage American rhetoric into advancements for racial equality. By this time, the U.S. was
willing to meet some of the demands of Civil Rights leaders because political officials “worried
about the impact of race discrimination on U.S. prestige abroad,” and as a result, “civil rights
reform came to be seen as crucial to U.S. foreign policy.”18 Though it could be argued that civil
rights reforms took hold based purely on the recognition that democratic rights belonged to all
citizens, Dudziak states that Cold War pressures for the U.S. to uphold its sense of international
prestige was, in part, why civil rights advancements were made. The U.S. needed to demonstrate
to the world that it could integrate African Americans into its democracy in order to legitimize
the image as the beacon of democracy it claimed before the world.
Because it was in the best interest of the United States to further its credibility as it
related to the Cold War, the advancement of civil rights took priority. Thus, the major
breakthrough came in 1954 with the Brown decision. Had the Supreme Court justices sided with
the Board of Education, then the U. S. would surely have been discredited as the champion of

17
18

Ibid, 34.
Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights, 6. Dudziak has led the breakthrough in tying together these two eras.
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democracy in the eyes of the world. This ruling foregrounded the deep linkages made between
Cold War objectives and civil rights interests.
Dudziak asserts that while members of the court were expected to be impartial, they were
shaped by the Cold War environment in which they were living. They were inclined to make
decisions based on an outcome that might benefit the United States regarding its reputation and
sense of security, both overseas and at home. “Within [the justices’] world, national security was
at risk, and national security would be enhanced by racial equality.”19 Indeed, it was easy to
cover up racial oppression by eliminating segregation, and because Brown involved children, it
also appealed to the hearts and minds of those it concerned. The decision in Brown became the
premier example of the democracy that existed in the United States. It offered proof that
democratic processes allowed America to resolve its problems through social change.20
Legal scholar Derrick A. Bell has written what he believed Warren’s opinion should have
addressed. Bell acknowledged that assessing the case from a strictly domestic perspective
elevates the role the U.S. government played in seeking progressive social change. But more
broadly, Brown was the product of converging and mutually beneficial developments abroad and
at home.21 According to Bell, one of the major components of racial segregation that the court
failed to address was that “[n]egro rights are recognized and protected for only so long as they
advance the nation’s interests.”22 He drew from then Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who
addressed the court at the time just before Brown was decided. Acheson declared,
[D]uring the past six years, the damage to our foreign relations attributable to [race
discrimination] has become progressively greater. The United States is under constant
19

Ibid, 104.
Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights, 104.
21
Dudziak, “Brown as a Cold War Case,” 40
22
Derrick A. Bell, “Derrick A. Bell (dissenting),” What Brown V. Board of Education Should Have Said: The
Nation's Top Legal Experts Rewrite America's Landmark Civil Rights Decision, ed. Jack Balkin (New York
University Press, 2001), 187.
20
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attack in the foreign press, over the foreign radio, and in such international bodies as the
United Nations because of various practices of discrimination against minority groups in
this country… [s]chool segregation, in particular, has been singled out for hostile foreign
comment in the United Nations and elsewhere… [R]acial discrimination in the United
States remains a source of constant embarrassment to this government in the day-to-day
conduct of its foreign relations; and it jeopardizes the effective maintenance of our moral
leadership of the free and democratic nations of the world.23
This plea explicitly demonstrated how central race relations were to U. S. foreign affairs.
Subsequently, Brown was only relevant as it pertained to global affairs, and not necessarily to the
rights of African Americans. The Brown decision effectively provided a symbolic victory for the
Civil Rights movement, while at the same time refurbishing America’s reputation in the eyes of
other nations. So long as it was beneficial for foreign relations, progress on race relations could
be pursued.
If Dudziak and Bell are correct in their assessments of these international factors, then
one might raise questions concerning the legitimacy and intention of Brown. If Brown was won
as a result of Cold War objectives, then how might that have affected the ways the new law was
enforced? Did it open pathways for forms of resistance? Was the U.S. government invested in
the decision, or was it simply a means of covering up a bad public and international image?
Additionally, if historians are to believe that war and foreign policy affected the outcome of
Brown, then it can be discerned that the intention of the ruling was, in some ways, disingenuous.
Without an earnest federal agenda to root out racial inequality, resistance to the decision could
take place in myriad forms. The Supreme Court alone could not have possibly enforced
desegregation because it lacked the constitutional power. A genuine commitment to

23

Ibid, 195.
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desegregation would have helped to topple the longstanding legal and social power that Jim
Crow held.24

John Rosales, “Fulfilling the Promise of Brown v. Board: From School and Housing Policies to the Courts,” NEA
News, May 10, 2019, accessed August 5, 2021. https://www.nea.org/advocating-for-change/new-fromnea/fulfilling-promise-brown-v-board-school-and-housing-policies.
24
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Plessy v Ferguson Redefined
Beyond the existential crisis the U.S. confronted during WWII and the Cold War, it also
had to clear the hurdle of re-interpreting the Constitution itself. In order to rule in favor of
desegregation, the Supreme Court would have to challenge a cornerstone decision that had
guided the country for nearly sixty years: Plessy v. Ferguson. In 1896, the Supreme Court upheld
segregation, declaring that “equal, but separate” accommodations were legal under the fourteenth
amendment’s “equal protection” clause.25 Before Brown, many viewed public school education
as a sector of public life that state governments did not need to provide equally for minority
groups.
The interpretation of Plessy v. Ferguson was central to the Brown case because it would
need to be overturned in order to achieve Brown’s goals, as well as America’s Cold War
concerns. Chief Justice Warren held that Plessy was an outdated judgment and should be
interpreted by the standard of the current day:
The question presented in these cases must be determined, not on the basis of conditions
existing when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, but in the light of the full
development of public education and its present place in American life throughout the
Nation” and that “[t]he ‘separate but equal’ doctrine adopted in Plessy v. Ferguson… has
no place in the field of public education.26
At a time when the Civil Rights movement was gaining significant momentum amid the
heightening pressures of the Cold War, Brown came at a pivotal moment in the country’s history.
No longer could the plight of African American communities be ignored, for the world was
watching. Southern politicians, however, disagreed with the Supreme Court’s new interpretation
of Plessy and held fast to the old one. They took it upon themselves to help form a united front,

25

Supreme Court Of The United States. U.S. Reports: Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537. 1895. Periodical, accessed
August 10, 2021. https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep163537/.
26
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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buoyed by individual citizens who were prepared to organize and deploy violence to preserve
segregation in the wake of Brown. What followed was massive resistance. On the one hand,
Brown meant that African Americans would now have equal protection under the law, and
should no longer fear that they were the target of segregationist policies in public schools. On the
other hand, a critical question remained: what would happen if state authorities refused to
enforce the new law of the land? Indeed, because systemic racism was not dealt with at its root,
African Americans would continue to face intense racism, discrimination, and even violence, in
spite of the new ruling. And massive resistance made this clear. In fact, it helped ignite a
constitutional crisis.
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“Massive Resistance”
Massive resistance on the part of various Southern states, Southern politicians, and White
activists ensured that efforts to deny school integration proceeded on a grand scale and in near
uniformity. On May 18, 1954, newspaper headlines around the South cried out against the ruling.
The Charleston News and Courier in South Carolina expressed its concern over states’ rights,
In depriving the states of the right to administer public schools according to their own
regional customs, the Supreme Court has cut deep into the sinews of the Republic… the
court decision drove another nail into the coffin of states’ rights… In most parts of the
South, whites and Negroes live in harmony. We do not look for rupture of this harmony
as a result of the court’s decision.27
In Charlottesville, Virginia, the Cavalier Daily voiced concern about the impact of segregation
and the toll it would take on the way of life to which Virginians had become accustomed. “It is
too early to tell what effect the Supreme Court decision to abolish segregated schools will have
on the South…. we feel that the people of the South are justified in their bitterness concerning
this decision. To many people, this decision is contrary to a way of life and violates the way in
which they have thought since 1619.”28 The Atlanta Constitution assured that no immediate
action to integrate schools would take place. It declared that the “Supreme Court has given us
time” and the “decision does not mean that Negro and white children will go to school together
this fall.”29 Perhaps no other rebuke was more overtly racist than that of the Daily News of
Starkville, Mississippi, which anticipated a staunch and violent reaction from its citizens:
Human blood may stain Southern soil in many places because of this decision but the
dark red stains of that blood will be on the marble steps of the United States Supreme
Court building. White and Negro children in the same schools will lead to miscegenation.
“Brown Reactions: Editorials,” PBS Learning Media, August 24, 2021, accessed August 12, 2021.
https://ny.pbslearningmedia.org/resource/osi04.soc.ush.civil.editorial/ibrowni-reactions-editorials/.
This is the first of a series of four excerpted quotations pulled from an aggregated compilation of newspaper
editorials written on May 18, 1954, the day after the Brown decision. The collection of primary source documents
captures the wide range of opinions about the ruling from that day.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
27
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Miscegenation leads to mixed marriages and mixed marriages lead to the mongrelization
of the human race.30
These four examples represent what became the four main pillars of massive resistance to
Brown: states’ rights, community backlash, deliberately delayed integration, and racial violence.
While it was generally understood that there would be some fallout from the ruling, the Supreme
Court overestimated the power of federal law to achieve social change and underestimated the
pervasiveness of racism that came in both overt and subtle forms.31 Though schools from border
states and in the peripheral south were beginning to adhere to integrationist policy, such as in
Kentucky, Oklahoma, Texas, and Arkansas, massive resistance in the South took hold and spread
as a damning representation of the racism the U.S. still bore.32
With such a clear and firm public rejection of Brown, neither branch of the federal
government was willing to take the political risk of supporting the new law. Southern states
maintained the belief in the decision outlined in Plessy v. Ferguson, despite Brown. Additionally,
some Southern state governments resisted integration by claiming that the decision did not
outline a specific plan for integration, nor did it give a time frame to do so.
The Supreme Court issued a follow-up ruling, dubbed Brown II. On May 31, 1955, in the
hopes of setting a standard for compliance, Justice Warren declared that schools were required to

30

Ibid.
Bell, “Derrick A. Bell (dissenting),” 185-200.
32
Michael J. Klarman, “How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis,” The Journal of American
History 81, no. 1 (1994): 81–118.
31
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submit desegregation proposals “with all deliberate speed.”33 The language of Brown II was so
vague, however, that it only bolstered Southern determination to defy the order.34
This ambiguous language ironically emboldened continued resistance, thus allowing
southern states to respond with all deliberate delay. In The Southern Manifesto: Massive
Resistance and the Fight to Preserve Segregation, John Kyle Day argues that the vague language
of Brown II “allowed the white South to dictate the interpretation of Brown II, setting the
slothfully circumspect timetable for the implementation of public school desegregation.”35 The
members of the Southern Congressional District banded together to form a united response,
claiming Brown was decided in contradiction to the Constitution and that it stripped the rights of
states to oversee school districts independently from federal involvement.36 As a result,
lawmakers from seven Southern states coalesced and issued The Southern Manifesto in 1956.
Most members of the Southern Congressional District wanted to claim credit for writing
the document.37 The manifesto vehemently accused the Supreme Court of exercising power
above the Constitution. Shockingly, the document warned that the effect Brown would have on
communities would be the destruction of “amicable relations between the white and Negro
races,” and that it had “planted hatred and suspicion where there has been heretofore friendship

33

Judgment, Brown v. Board of Education; 5/31/1955; Case File for Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka
et al.; Appellate Jurisdiction Case Files, 1792 - 2010; Records of the Supreme Court of the United States, Record
Group 267; National Archives, accessed August 11, 2021.
https://www.docsteach.org/documents/document/judgment-brown-v-board.
34
Derrick A. Bell, “The Unintended Lessons in Brown v. Board of Education,” NYLS Law Review 49, no. 3 (2005):
1053-1067.
35
John Kyle Day, The Southern Manifesto: Massive Resistance and the Fight to Preserve Segregation (Jackson:
University Press of Mississippi, 2014), 3-5.
36
The Southern Manifesto, 1956, accessed July 24, 2021. https://d1lexza0zk46za.cloudfront.net/history/amdocs/southern-manifesto.pdf. The original document declared, “We regard the decision of the Supreme Court in the
school cases as clear abuse of judicial power. It climaxes a trend in the Federal judiciary undertaking to legislate, in
derogation of the authority of Congress, and to encroach upon the reserved rights of the states and the people.”
37
Day, The Southern Manifesto, 3-5.

Brand 24

and understanding.”38 The manifesto also implied that Black people should be grateful for the
rights they have and not make more demands. They believed “separate but equal” was a
functional policy, and that Brown threatened to disrupt the peace. In a final ominous statement, it
urged state and local governments to condemn desegregation, and encouraged rioting as a form
of resistance.39
Why were so many white Southerners motivated to resist Brown so strongly? In his
essay, Why Massive Resistance?, legal scholar Michael Klarman argues that the balance of
power between moderate and conservative politicians played a major role in stoking massive
resistance. While there was a relatively large base of moderate sentiment within the South,
conservatives held stronger convictions and were better equipped to mold public opinion toward
extremism. Their commitment and capacity to use repressive tactics against moderates (who
were by no means fervent integrationists, to be sure) created the appearance that southern Whites
were united behind massive resistance.40 According to Klarman, one way this was achieved was
through the veiled threat to shut schools down before integration could take place. In this sense,
“many southern whites… preferred token integration to school closures, but very few favored
token integration over segregation. Thus, opinion polls on Brown revealed minimal support
among southern whites… The difference between white ‘moderates’ and ‘extremists’ was in the
costs they were prepared to bear to maintain segregation”41 Suppressing any voice of tolerance
toward integration was pivotal to maintaining the facade of solid support against Brown, which
in turn, preserved segregationist policy.
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Historian Tony Badger agrees with Klarman that successful political infighting from the
White backlash silenced racially moderate politicians, despite their having developed a foothold
with voters. Badger places equal blame, however, on poor leadership from the NAACP in
targeting school segregation for racial advancements. As Badger observes, “in singling out
schools, they challenged the area the white South would defend most vigorously. It would have
been better and less provocative if they had addressed voting rights or the economic goals of the
class-based civil rights movement of the 1940s.”42 Although Black activists were appealing to
the hearts and minds of their adversaries through the issue of schooling, they instead inspired the
opposite effect -- many considered children to be the most precious and untouchable of areas
when it came to issues regarding racial equality. Throughout the 1950s, Badger asserts, the Civil
Rights movement would have been better served had it addressed other concerns that were
already gaining some momentum, such as voting rights.43
Klarman takes Badger’s claims a step further, contending that Brown was not as
instrumental in helping to energize the Civil Rights Movement. Indeed, Klarman argues that the
positive influence of Brown on the Civil Rights Movement was exaggerated. For Klarman,
Brown itself did not inspire civil rights leaders to act; rather, it was the backlash to Brown that
inspired Black activists to organize.44 This distinction is important in determining Brown’s
overall impact vis-a-vis the chain of events that led to the most significant protests and gains of
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the civil rights era. Many historians mark Brown as the beginning of the civil rights Era, but
Klarman believes that WWII provided a larger impetus to civil rights consciousness and protest.
In the wake of Brown, massive resistance metastasized, solidifying the determination of
Southern communities and politicians to act by whatever means necessary to prevent Black
integration into white society. The lynching of Emmitt Till in 1955 exemplified this, as did
violent attacks on the Montgomery Bus Boycott in the same year, in which segregationists
bombed the homes of the boycott’s leaders.45
Klarman’s “Backlash Thesis” is crucial for two reasons. First, while acknowledging the
importance of Brown, it downplays the direct role it played in the larger civil rights movement at
that time. Secondly, Klarman measures the impact of the ruling based more on the repercussions
that followed the decision; that is, massive resistance shifted the agenda of activists and
accelerated their activism. Other aspects of civil rights garnered attention as a result of the
backlash, such as voting rights and issues around public transportation, while education was
largely adversely affected and ignored. Thus, for Klarman, Brown’s importance in education and
as a pillar for civil rights, serves merely as a distraction for historians. He concludes that Brown
“elicit[ed] greater violence and intransigence” among white southerners in an aspect of life
certain to be met with the most resistance.46
Although, at the time, Brown could be touted as an exemplar of American freedom and
opportunity, Southern politicians viewed the ruling as an excuse to further solidify the socioeconomic injustices most Black communities already faced. Because Brown levelled the playing
field for educational access under the law, racist political leaders could take advantage by
blaming African Americans for their struggles to succeed, and not for the systemic lack of access
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to real social, political, and economic power. Derrick Bell concludes that this argument
effectively cemented the unequal status of Black people. Brown had succeeded in bringing about
a transformation without genuine or tangible change.47
Three years after Brown, nine African American students were granted entry to Little
Rock Central High School. However, Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus, once a moderate, who
had now moved to the hard right in response to Brown and voters, ordered the state’s National
Guard to forcefully prevent admission of the nine Black students. Guardsmen with drawn
bayonets prevented the entry of the students. Making matters worse was a violent mob that
formed outside the school, threatening to lynch them.48 President Eisenhower, who had indicated
that he did not agree with Brown, was compelled to send federal troops to Little Rock to stop the
blockade and to escort the nine Black students into the school. What became known as the Little
Rock crisis quickly turned into worldwide news of a constitutional crisis, which dramatized a
showdown between President Eisenhower, Governor Faubus, Black activists, and violent
segregationists. The nine students had the protection of law under Brown. Still, the Supreme
Court ruling was not enough to shake segregationists’ commitment to Jim Crow. And the Little
Rock nine knew that the intention of Brown was not being met. Daisy Bates, leader of the
Arkansas branch of the NAACP and an adviser to the nine students, who helped them navigate
the integration of the school, wrote of her “shock at the utter disregard of all humanity by the
segregationists, who did not shrink from using violent methods against innocent children in their
struggle to maintain racial inequality.”49
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Some of the students felt the same way. In interviews they would give years later, Ernest
Green recalled how baffled he was that Faubus claimed to have called out the National Guard as
a safety measure for the students. Faubus insisted, “my objective in the Little Rock crisis was to
prevent violence and death in the disorders that became imminent.”50 Malba Pattilla Beals,
another student, remembered the fear she felt when even police “were not willing to fight their
own [the white mob] in order to protect us” and that the offer was made that “if they allowed the
mob to hang one [black] kid, they could then get the rest out.”51 Despite threats of violence that
day, both Green and Beals maintained that they remained focused on obtaining the better
education they believed they could get at Central High. After being chosen to be the first to
integrate that school, Beals recalled that her mother told her that an “education is the key to
survival.” Green reflected that on graduation day, nobody clapped for him when he received his
diploma. To Green, it did not matter, “I had accomplished what I had come there for.”52 Though
massive resistance exposed the idea that violence could triumph over federal law and the
Supreme Court, Brown’s intention, after all, was not lost on these students.
The perceived aid from the federal government converged yet again with Cold War
implications. Because the Little Rock crisis made international news, President Eisenhower's
decision to ensure entry for the nine students won praise across the globe; the US succeeded in
its goal of promoting its image as a beacon of democracy. It demonstrated that the federal
government was behind Brown, even if some state governments were unwilling to comply. As
Dudziak asserts, “The abstract principle of Brown seemed to be the thing needed to maintain
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American prestige. In that sense, Brown and the Little Rock crisis successfully protected the
image of American democracy, despite not actually desegregating schools.”53
For historian Karen Anderson, the event illustrated how the White appeal to segregation
provoked state recalcitrance in the face of federal intervention. “The idea of outside [federal]
interference allowed locals to deny any responsibility for events occurring in their midst… it
allowed them to believe their actions and political commitments were not an issue… it also
justified a politics of inaction.”54 Politicians fortified their position of state autonomy by
claiming the federal government was literally forcing desegregation upon states. Those
responsible for denying the nine Black students’ entry could stand their ground by invoking the
state’s right to act in what they believed to be their best interest. Paradoxically, Black activists
sought intervention from the federal government to counter massive resistance and enforce
Brown, but federal involvement only further motivated segregationists already determined to
mobilize.55
Other instances of local resistance against the ruling evaded international scrutiny.
Without worldwide attention, the federal government was less likely to intervene. Derrick Bell
notes that “[Southern states’] predictable outraged resistance will undermine and eventually
negate judicial enforcement efforts, while political support for the Court’s decision, like virtually
every other racial rights measure adopted basically to serve white interests once those interests
have been served, will become irrelevant.”56 So long as broader interests between the federal
government and civil rights measures did not overlap, the effect was twofold: U.S. officials
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could avoid more conflicts of a similar nature, and Southern states could get away with
maintaining segregation by passing elusive laws that were no less effective.
Historian Carol Anderson considers this cloaked approach to be “white rage,” marking
the ways in which federal and state governments intentionally operated to combat the
advancement of Black people in any capacity but often in imperceptible ways. “White rage is not
about visible violence,” Anderson observes, “but rather it works its way through the courts, the
legislatures, and a range of government bureaucracies. It wreaks havoc subtly, almost
imperceptibly. Working the halls of power, it can achieve its ends far more effectively, far more
destructively.”57 “White rage” has been a crucial tactic used by white elites to avoid the overt
racism of violent segregationists and instead enact legislation targeting Black people
economically, socially, politically, and within the realm of education. A key application of
“white rage,” Anderson points out, was the ways in which political leaders manipulated the
Brown ruling in order to destroy this moment in Black advancement.
White rage emerged in ways that went beyond the typical scope of education to re-shape
the impact of the Brown decision. Mississippi’s enforcement of literacy tests as a requirement for
voting was related to Brown because Brown meant giving equal educational opportunities to
Black children. The Mississippi state government concluded that Blacks should be held
accountable for their new access to education, and imposing literacy tests on Black voters was
one way, proponents argued, though the move was actually intended to suppress Black voters.
As Southern states manipulated their interpretation of Brown to justify opposing school
integration, they passed new legislation that stripped Black people of their right to vote.58
Similarly, Alabama adopted a gauntlet of literacy tests and heavily enforced them in the area of

57
58

Carol Anderson, White Rage: The Unspoken Truth of Our Racial Divide (New York: Bloomsbury, 2016), 3.
Ibid, 76-77.

Brand 31

the state known as the “Black Belt,” where the Black population was the majority. There, less
than two percent of the Black population was registered to vote as a result of the tests. The large
disparity between educated Blacks and Whites ensured the suppression of the Black vote, while
white state officials could maintain the pre-Brown status quo.
The reach and effect with which massive resistance was able to suppress Black people
not only in education, but also at the expense of other civil liberties has led historians to reassess
the effectiveness of Brown. Unfortunately for African Americans looking for educational
opportunities, equal access would be frustratingly denied in areas of the country that perhaps
needed change the most. In an article written thirty years after Brown, the New York Times
quoted James Nabrit, counsel for the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, who recalled
that there was still not a single black child in a white school in Virginia, Alabama, Mississippi,
Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina.''59 Massive resistance became the way of the South, and
there was little that the Supreme Court could do about it. In an article from the National
Education Association, John Rosales determined that “For school… laws to be implemented in
the spirit of Brown, local and federal judges would have to carry the torch,” something
unequivocally antithetical to Southern policy makers determined to hold on to power and
privilege.60

Walter Goodman, “Brown v. Board of Education: Uneven Results 30 Years Later,” The New York Times, May 17,
1984, accessed August 20, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/1984/05/17/us/brown-v-board-of-education-unevenresults-30-years-later.html.
60
Rosales, “Fulfilling the Promise of Brown v. Board.”
59

Brand 32

De Jure vs. De Facto Segregation
Perhaps the most frustrating debate that derived from the language of Brown was over the
definition of segregation itself. In the deep South, segregation was easy to identify, and
southerners were willing to combat desegregation tooth and nail in order to uphold what they
believed to be their right to separate facilities under the Jim Crow regime. Such purposeful
policies of discrimination enacted through legal means, constituted de jure segregation. A much
more complicated web to untangle was characterized primarily by schools segregated by
neighborhood in the North and the West, known as de facto segregation, where the “racial
imbalance derived from unintentional or ‘fortuitous’ actions by state and private entities.”61
In exploring the use of de facto segregation as a tactic of obfuscation used by school
districts to reject integration, Michael Glass posits that the term de facto segregation was first
conceived of and utilized by civil rights advocates as a means to expose continued segregation.
The term was originally intended to shine a light on other forms of segregation in schools.
However, it quickly framed a defense that claimed segregation existed only as a phenomenon of
personal choice to live in racially homogenous neighborhoods.62 Glass notes that “civil rights
advocates brandished the phrase as a sword to combat racial inequality [while] their opponents
embraced it as a shield to defend the status quo.”63 Despite its origins, de facto segregation
provided a convenient cover for discriminatory practices to flourish not only in the South, but
also across the North and West.
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While the Brown decision could eradicate de jure segregation, particularly in the South,
in the North and West, de facto segregation became the center of a new debate. Even at the
highest level, President Nixon aimed to clarify his administration’s school desegregation policy
by making a distinction between the two. “There is a fundamental distinction between so‐called
‘de jure’ and ‘de facto’ segregation,” Nixon declared in 1970. “De jure segregation arises by law
or by the deliberate act of school officials and is unconstitutional; de facto segregation results
from residential housing patterns and does not violate the Constitution.”64 In contrast, United
States District Judge Robert L. Carter, appointed during the Nixon presidency, described a “[vast
gulf] between equality as a concept of the law and equality in actual life.”65 Factions within
government and judicial skepticism further obscured the central aims of Brown. The idea of de
facto segregation raised an important question: was this form of segregation constitutional under
Brown? Neighborhood and school districting became a means of covertly perpetuating racial
segregation, eroding the goal to increase educational opportunities. Education historians Erica
Frankenberg and Kendra Taylor argue that this circumstance lies at the root of existing
educational inequalities to this day.66
As a result of federal indifference, school board zoning decisions, and residential
patterns, de facto segregation was as pervasive in the North and West as it was in the South.
Lower level courts were divided on the constitutionality of such decisions, and it was difficult to
prove underlying racially motivated intentions as a means of upholding Brown. Any school
board that was pressed could claim that their choices were made strictly to benefit their students.
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The violation of the fourteenth amendment’s equal protection clause could be scarcely
established without the ability to point to concrete examples of racial bias.67 Legal scholar, Elise
C. Boddie insists that the legal skepticism invoked by school boards “widened the gap between
de jure and de facto segregation and narrowed the field of possible constitutional claims for
achieving integration.”68
Judge Robert Carter has pointed to the South Carolina case, Briggs v. Elliott, as the
juncture in the de jure-de facto divide. Briggs relied on the interpretation that Brown did not
require integration, it merely forbade segregation, which meant schools did not have an
“affirmative duty” to make integration a priority. Writing in 1965, Carter described this as a
“meaningless distinction, however, unless the fourteenth amendment guarantee of equality to
Negroes is once again, as in the ‘separate but equal’ era, to be reduced to a legal abstraction - an
arid promise having no application to social reality.”69 Nevertheless, the distinction was upheld
in Briggs, which helped set the precedence for other communities to follow.
Virginia Senator Harry F. Byrd threatened to shut down public schools that complied
with Brown. Furthermore, he stated that desegregation was unnecessary because de facto
residential segregation was already in place.70 Integration would have required geographical
shifts of educational districts in order to implement integration. The split in community lines lent
itself to government officials who appeared to side with integration, while simultaneously
insisting that achieving it would be harmful for their community. The superintendent of the
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Norfolk school board portended, “It is just a question of what is the best plan… I’m in favor of
carrying out the Supreme Court decree with the least harm to the pupils… and the schools.”71
This tactic of evasion proved useful for many communities around the nation to utilize. Though
pushback from African American communities persisted, “[t]hese extended legal battles allowed
for year after year to drizzle by while the continued existence of separate and decidedly unequal
schools consigned black children to some of the worst education that America had to offer.”72
Consider the Chicago school system as an example of the complex tensions between two
opposing camps -- those who stood for maintaining the status quo of de facto segregation, and
those who opposed it, and whose response was met even more backlash. In 1965, nearly ninety
percent of Black students within Chicago Public Schools attended all-Black schools.
Superintendent Benjamin C. Willis testified in front of the Committee on Education and Labor in
the House of Representatives that Chicago “has never segregated children as such on any basis”
and that “segregated housing patterns” were to blame for the composition of public schools.73 In
addition, Mothers Opposed to Meddling in Schools (MOMS), a group of white mothers against
desegregation, stated, “I do not think we are even morally bound to end de facto segregation in
the schools. De facto segregation is a happenstance caused by living patterns and not a deliberate
attempt to segregate or isolate Negro children.”74 Glass cites this example as a classic instance of
the de facto defense.
Despite the success of the Civil Rights Movement in winning crucial legislation in the
1960s, it became increasingly clear that school integration remained an undelivered promise.
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Rosie Simpson, a leading Black education reformer in Chicago, reflected on her evolving role in
realizing integration in schools, “equal opportunity was what we were fighting for, even though
we talked about integration. I think they took that as meaning that we wanted to go to school
with White kids, and [Black kids] would automatically learn, which was not true. We were
talking equal opportunity.”75 From this thinking about how Black communities ought to take the
reins in educating Black youth, came the radical notion that they should have been in control all
along. Thus, Black education reformers invoked their right to control majority Black schools,
launching a new political movement among certain Black communities.
In A Political Education: Black Politics and Education Reform in Chicago since the
1960s, Elizabeth Todd-Breland illustrates the significance of Black education reformers in
charge of controlling their own educational opportunities. This new wave of political thought
embraced the plain fact that Whites were unwilling to truly integrate in an equitable way.
Ironically, Black education reformers could quote from The Southern Manifesto that had so
vehemently opposed desegregation, which stated, “[communities] should not be deprived by
Government of the right to direct the lives and education of their own children.”76 Essentially,
African American school leaders simply wanted to have control over their own educational
institutions through the constructs of self-empowerment and self-determination. As white elites
were determined to preserve “separate but equal” via white rage and de facto segregation, many
Black communities became determined to work with local governments by gaining funding for
their institutions in order to achieve some semblance of equality through their own vision of
educational opportunity.
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Shaped by the emergence of Black Power politics in the late 1960s, especially in the
urban north, Black education reformers decided that it was up to them to take control of their
respective educational institutions. In Todd-Breland’s words, “The shift from desegregation to
community control was not solely a response to the state’s failure to desegregate schools. It also
reflected the prominence of a strain that foregrounded Black empowerment and self-governance
in efforts to increase Black achievement.”77 At first, communities sought to work within the
federal framework of public education to access funds for resources that would improve schools.
Yet, a persistent racist agenda, especially at the local and state levels, limited the impact that
Black education reformers were able to make. Although a strong presence of teachers and
students lobbied and protested, their limited access to political power meant their ideals could
not be realized.
Without the ability to access a strong public educational system within Black majority
communities, a second strand of political thought for Black achievement emerged in the form of
independent institutions. These “African-centered educational institutions insisted on
independence from the state and the creation of a unique African diasporic subjectivity,
curriculum, and worldview that resonated with the cultural currents of the Black Power era.”78
Even if independent Black institutions could thrive, questions about integration and access
remained. One Black student, Imani Perry, decided to attend public school after ten years in an
all-Black private school. She felt that to be a part of American society, she needed to be in a
setting that would best reflect the environment she would one day have to engage.79 She
acknowledged, however, that her education in the private school felt far superior to that of the
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public school. The split between community control and independent school solutions left Black
communities divided in their efforts to enhance educational opportunities. Todd-Breland points
to how inconsistent these efforts were, and attributed a lack of success in education reform, in
part, to the conflicting ideals among top Black education reformers.
Beyond all the measures that needed to be taken to improve schooling for Black majority
communities, it is worth mentioning that teachers themselves were also split in their efforts. On
the one hand, their fight was purely on the students’ behalf, which required access to resources
and money for their schools to better serve those who attended their institutions. On the other
hand, teachers fought for better salaries, recognition, and support.80 This duality embedded in
Black education reform was prevalent even when Harold Washington, the first Black mayor of
Chicago, was elected in 1983. Washington’s loyalties were split as well between working within
the political system to advance education standards and acting as a voice for Black education
reformers. The lack of a clear path to realize Black achievement in conjunction with the
ambivalence of a White political agenda that aimed to preserve the status quo, meant sparse
victories for Black education reform during the latter decades of the twentieth century.
According to political theorist Michael Hanchard, the exclusion of Black people from political
power is a large part of what perpetuates racial divides.81 Yet, even when there was a Black
voice present in the political arena, as in the case of Harold Washington, that voice struggled to
gain enough influence, consistently leaving Black communities woefully short of receiving equal
benefits and attention.
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In the midst of determining what segregation was and was not, the consequences of the
de facto debate are what historians point to as the negative outcomes of Brown. For many
historians, Brown was enforced deliberately at the expense of equal educational opportunities for
African American children. Judge Robert Carter directed the attention back to the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. He determined that the decisive factor in whether
this right was being met should be based on the equal education of Black children. He concluded
that if the overall outcome was hindered by legal and political delays, the fourteenth
amendment’s promises remain unfulfilled and decidedly unconstitutional.82
It is clear that the objective of Brown was to provide students with the opportunity to
develop to their fullest potential. Glass describes the political gaming that resulted from the
semantics of the de jure-de facto binary as the seminal roadblock in achieving Brown’s most
core goal. He concludes,
Naming, defining, and framing the issues—these are the building blocks of politics. De
facto segregation began as a necessary tool in the insurgent campaign against the fact of
northern school segregation. However, when public officials appropriated the phrase,
they redefined segregation as a fact, as an inescapable reality. Once it was affirmed by
the courts and cemented into national law, the de jure-de facto binary cast a deep fog
over the public policies that created and maintained segregated landscapes. It is a fog that
advocates and scholars have been trying to cut through ever since.83
As the Brown decision grows older, the consequences are somewhat easier to trace. De facto
segregation left a detrimental legacy of obfuscation and inequity that persisted for decades.
While not as overt as de jure segregation, the lasting power of de facto segregation has actively
impeded equal educational opportunities.
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Epilogue
Brown was a monumental decision that forced the nation to consider the role and
importance of equality, race, and democracy. But sixty-five years after the ruling, many critical
questions remain unanswered for Black communities still trying to gain equal footing in
education. For all that Brown stood for, the essential tension still boils down to the purported
values of American democracy versus the lived realities of Black citizens. Though Brown
remains a keystone in the long history of Black advancement, its reverberating effect has, in
many ways, slowed the progress that African American communities are still trying to achieve -equal educational opportunities.
There are two primary intentions laid out in the Brown ruling that historians must
consider when analyzing its lasting effects. Desegregation and educational opportunity were the
defining characteristics. Although the former could ultimately be considered a successful
endeavor by simply comparing data of integrated school percentages, a recent article describes
how Brown's core mission of encouraging integration can best be defined as unfinished. It argues
that after some “gains through the late 1980s, the public-school system is undergoing a
‘resegregation’ that has left African-American and Latino students ‘experiencing more isolation’
than a generation ago."84 Derrick Bell echoes this claim, citing hundreds of school desegregation
lawsuits, many lasting for decades, in which most Black and Latino students still attend public
schools that are both racially separate and educationally ineffective.85 Another article published
on the 40th anniversary of Brown noted how the Supreme Court retreated from signaling
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desegregation as a priority among the nation’s goals and objectives.86 Even if desegregation was
achieved at face value, the intention of Brown to secure equal opportunity, the more important
goal, remains largely unrealized.
The existing gap, in large part, can be attributed to the lasting effects that de facto
segregation had in masking racial bias and maintaining white supremacy. Although de jure
segregation could be effectively eliminated through positive law, de facto segregation,
represented through long-standing societal norms, flourished almost unchanged. So powerful
were these norms that even in the face of a Supreme Court decision, de facto segregation has
remained intact without accomplishing the intent of educational equality. For a decision that
should have transformed America, it could not, however, transform people or institutions intent
on maintaining the status quo. As Martin Luther King Jr. would put it in a speech delivered in
1965, “it may be true that morality cannot be legislated” and that “the law cannot change the
heart.” He went on to declare that “Old Man Segregation is on his deathbed, but history has
proven that social systems have a great last-minute breathing power, and the guardians of the
status quo are always on hand with their oxygen tents to keep the old order alive.”87
In 2007, in a case that considered whether racial segregation was commensurate with
educational equality, Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer eloquently reflected on Brown’s
legacy. He wrote,
In this Court’s finest hour, Brown v. Board of Education challenged [this country’s
history of segregation] and helped to change it. For Brown held out a promise. It was a
promise embodied in [constitutional] Amendments designed to make citizens of slaves. It
was the promise of true racial equality—not as a matter of fine words on paper, but as a
matter of everyday life in the Nation’s cities and schools. It was about the nature of a
Charles J. Russo, J. John Harris, and Rosetta F. Sandidge, “Brown v. Board of Education at 40: A Legal History
of Equal Educational Opportunities in American Public Education,” The Journal of Negro Education 63, no. 3
(1994): 297–309.
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democracy that must work for all Americans. It sought one law, one Nation, one people,
not simply as a matter of legal principle but in terms of how we actually live.88
Breyer’s plea for recognition of the distinction between integration and educational opportunity
exposes the deep imbalances that have shaped the legacy of Brown.
Understanding crucial factors and outcomes that relate to Brown sheds light on the
original intent of what was, on its face, an historic decision. Yet, it can be determined that
despite the grand intention of Brown, much of the landscape for meaningful educational
opportunities remains challenging terrain for Black communities to navigate. Even after so much
time has passed and so much effort has been expended to ensure equity in education, Black
communities continue to confront a massive wall of resistance.
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